Ruetsche (2011) claims that an abstract C*-algebra of observables will not contain all of the physically significant observables for a quantum system with infinitely many degrees of freedom. This would signal that in addition to the abstract algebra, one must use Hilbert space representations for some purposes. I argue to the contrary that there is a way to recover all of the physically significant observables by purely algebraic methods.
Introduction
It is by now well known that in quantum theories with infinitely many degrees of freedom like quantum field theory and quantum statistical mechanics, the presence of unitarily inequivalent representations stymies the extension of our interpretive practices from the ordinary quantum mechanics of finite systems. Ruetsche (2011) lays out the interpretive options in the wake of this problem of unitarily inequivalent representations. One can be a Hilbert Space Conservative and maintain that possible worlds correspond to density operators on a particular privileged Hilbert space containing a concrete irreducible representation of the algebra of observables. Or one can be an Algebraic Imperialist and hold that possible worlds are represented by the states on the abstract C*-algebra of observables, which captures the structure all representations have in common. Finally, one can be a Universalist, aligning with the Conservative in viewing states as density operators on a Hilbert space, but picking the (reducible) universal representation of the abstract
Hilbert Space Conservatism
On the other hand, if one wants to be a Hilbert Space Conservative and maintain an interpretation via the Hilbert space formalism like those usually discussed for ordinary quantum mechanics, then one must pick a particular Hilbert space representation to interpret. When one is working in the context of a particular Hilbert space H, one can define the weak operator topology on B(H) by the following criterion for convergence (Reed & Simon 1980 , p. 183): a net {A i } i∈X converges 6 For more on these positions and their advantages and disadvantages, see Arageorgis (1995) and Ruetsche (2002 , 2003 , 2011 . Of course, as Ruetsche describes, there are many more subtle interpretive options, but we deal here only with three of the simplest cases.
weakly to A (written A i → A) just in case for all φ, ψ ∈ H, φ, A i ψ → φ, Aψ in C. Recall that the GNS theorem allows us to take any C*-algebra of observables A and, having chosen some state ω, represent it via the representation π ω as a subalgebra π ω (A) ⊆ B(H ω ) for some Hilbert space H ω . Using the weak operator topology on B(H ω ) as a physically relevant notion of approximation, 7 one can include in any algebra of observables the operators that are physically indistinguishable from or well approximated by the observables already picked out in our algebra.
To do so, we take the weak operator closure (written π ω (A)) of our original algebra of observables π ω (A)-this adds to our original algebra all limit points of weak operator converging nets. Any weak operator closed subalgebra of a Hilbert space is called a von Neumann algebra, so π ω (A) will be called the von Neumann algebra affiliated with the representation π ω . If the state ω that we used to take our GNS representation is pure, Ruetsche argues that Hilbert Space Conservatism is inadequate because it does not give us access 7 The motivation for this standard practice is that in the weak operator topology, a net of observables well approximates (i.e. converges to) another observable just in case it approximates it with respect to all possible expectation values and transition probabilities, and hence with respect to the empirical predictions of the theory. We will discuss the significance of this in the next section. 8 A state ω is pure if whenever ω = a 1 ω 1 + a 2 ω 2 for states ω 1 , ω 2 , it follows that ω 1 = ω 2 = ω.
to enough states. In theories with infinitely many degrees of freedom, the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations entails that for any privileged irreducible representation (π, H), there is some algebraic state that cannot be implemented as a density operator on H. This would be fine if we only ever needed the density operator states on a single Hilbert space to accomplish the goals of physics, but there are instances in which we need to appeal to two states which cannot be represented as density operators on the same irreducible Hilbert space representation in the course of giving a single physically significant explanation (Ruetsche 2003 (Ruetsche , 2006 This may push the Hilbert Space Conservative to try to find a Hilbert space on which all states can be represented as density operators. The Universalist seeks to do precisely this.
Universalism
The Universalist agrees with the Hilbert Space Conservative that we need a Hilbert space representation of the abstract algebra A to interpret our quantum theory but disagrees that we need an irreducible representation. The Universalist holds that the universal representation is the privileged representation of the abstract algebra. Letting S A be the set of states on A and the GNS representation of any ω ∈ S A be denoted by (π ω , H ω ), the universal representation is given by (π U , H U ), where
is the universal Hilbert space and for each A ∈ A
The universal representation is guaranteed to be faithful (Kadison & Ringrose 1997 , p. 281, Remark 4.5.8) so every element A ∈ A has a unique counterpart in π U (A). The Universalist, like the Hilbert Space Conservative, has access to more observables than the Algebraic Imperialist. The universal Hilbert space carries its own weak operator topology defined precisely as above, which allows us to take the weak operator closure π U (A) of our original algebra, thereby obtaining the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra of A. Since π U is reducible, it follows that
For the Universalist, the physically measurable quantities are the self-adjoint elements of π U (A), and the physically possible states are density operators on H U . Conservative, having privileged some pure state ω and its GNS representation (π ω , H ω ), acquires all of the observables in π ω (A) = B(H ω ). The new observables are the ones that Ruetsche calls parochial observables; these are limit points in the weak operator topology of nets of observables from the original algebra and so they can be thought of as approximations to or idealizations from the observables we already recognized. 10 Many of these observables have real physical import (e.g., the temperature observable) but have no analogue in the abstract algebra. So the Hilbert Space
Conservative gains access to more observables than the Algebraic Imperialist. These observables are physically significant, e.g. for giving explanations of thermodynamic phase transitions. According to Ruetsche, the Algebraic Imperialist runs into a problem because she cannot recognize these operators as physically possible observables, and so cannot vindicate such explanations.
I will argue that there is a way for both the Imperialist and the Universalist to account for parochial observables. The problem of parochial observables only appears because we have given the Conservative more tools than the Imperialist-specifically, tools for representing idealizations and approximations. Once we give the Imperialist the analogous tools on the abstract algebra, she has no trouble representing the parochial observables.
10 By saying this, I do not mean to take a stance on whether the limit points are bona fide observables or "merely" idealizations, and I also do not mean to take a stance on whether the idealizations here are indispensable (See, eg., Callender 2001; Batterman 2005 Batterman , 2009 ). I hope only to invoke the notion that a topology captures a notion of similarity or resemblance and that limit points can be thought of as relevantly resembling elements of the original algebra to arbitrarily high accuracy so that we are licensed to use them for some scientific purposes. For more on limiting relations capturing a notion of similarity, resemblance, and approximation, see Butterfield (2011a Butterfield ( , 2011b and Fletcher (2014).
Parochial Observables for the Imperialist
When one thinks of an abstract C*-algebra, one usually thinks of it as coming equipped with the topology induced by its norm. This of course corresponds to the uniform topology of a concrete C*-algebra of operators acting on a Hilbert space. But just as one can consider alternative topologies on concrete algebras of operators, one can consider alternative topologies on the abstract algebra prior to taking a representation. One of the alternative topologies on the abstract algebra corresponds in a certain sense to the algebraic translation of the weak operator topology. To motivate this, we must first think about the significance of the weak operator topology. I stated in the previous section that the weak operator topology gives us a criterion of convergence based on expectation values and transition probabilities, and so gives us a notion of approximation relevant to the empirical content of the theory. But this can be made more precise. The following proposition 11 shows that the weak operator topology of a representation is the topology for convergence of expectation values with respect to a privileged collection of states-namely the finite rank density operators on a Hilbert space representation. (1) The net {A i } converges to A ∈ B(H) in the weak operator topology on B(H).
(2) For all states φ on A implementable by a finite rank density operator Φ on H, φ(A i ) = T r(ΦA i ) converges to T r(ΦA) in C.
One remark before we proceed: in clause (2) the expectation values converge as complex numbers even though there is in general no element of the abstract algebra that the net of observables converges to. This is because the parochial observable (the limit point of the net) in general will not have an analog in the abstract algebra. However, the Algebraic Imperialist has access to a topology that defines a notion of convergence using the expectation values of all of the states she deems physically possible. The weak (σ(A, A * )) topology 12 on an abstract C*-algebra A is defined as follows. Let A * refer to the dual space of continuous linear functionals on the Banach space A. A net {A i } ∈ A converges in the weak
in C. The notation σ(A, A * ) signifies that the weak topology is the weakest topology on A that makes all of the bounded linear functionals in A * continuous. Now we see from Prop. 1 that the notion of convergence given by the weak operator topology on a representation is simply the notion of convergence that we get by using the weak (σ(A, A * )) topology with attention restricted to a particular set of states-those that can be represented by finite rank density operators. Likewise, the weak (σ(A, A * )) topology is the analogue of the weak operator topology for the abstract algebra in the sense that it is an appropriate generalization to a notion of convergence with respect to the expectation values of all states on the abstract algebra.
Insofar as the Hilbert Space Conservative is justified in using the weak operator topology as a physically relevant standard of approximation or idealization, the Algebraic Imperialist is justified in using the weak (σ(A, A * )) topology as a physically relevant standard of approximation or idealization too. The Imperialist is concerned with approximation and idealization with respect to the expectation values of all states on the abstract algebra.
13 12 The nomenclature here is a bit unfortunate. The weak topology (sometimes called the weak Banach space topology) on an abstract C*-algebra is to be distinguished from the weak operator topology on its particular representations. We will see the difference in what follows.
13 I do not claim that the weak topology is the right one for the Algebraic Imperialist or that there even is a right topology to use (See Sec. 5). Just as the Hilbert Space Conservative may have access to multiple topologies on B(H), the Algebraic Imperialist may have access to multiple topologies on A. My claim is simply that the weak topology on A is analogous to the weak operator topology on B(H) in the sense that they derive from the same physical motivations for approximation and idealization, and they have analogous conditions for convergence.
There is a sense in which the abstract algebra A and its representations are not complete with respect to the weak and weak operator topologies, respectively (even though they are both complete with respect to the norm topology). There are nets of observables whose relevant expectation values converge in C but which have no limit point in the abstract algebra. To find those limit points, we must think of the algebra of observables as living in some kind of ambient space of observables; for the Hilbert Space Conservative, this is just the collection B(H) of operators on some Hilbert space that the Imperialist eschews. But the Imperialist also has access to an ambient space of observables of her own, and we will see that this ambient space allows us to find the limit points of nets of observables in the weak (σ(A, A * )) topology just as B(H) allows the Hilbert Space Conservative to find the limit points of nets of observables in the weak operator topology.
Recall that the dual of any Banach space X, written X * , is the set of continuous linear function-But does the Algebraic Imperialist gain access to the observables that Ruetsche argued are physically significant for giving explanations? Recall that the reason the problem of parochial 14 At this point, one might want to distinguish between two different kinds of Algebraic Imperialists-one who believes the physically significant observables reside in A and the norm topology gives the right notion of convergence and another who believes the physically significant observables reside in A * * and the weak (or weak*) topology gives the right notion of convergence. All I claim is that there is a systematic relationship between these positions and if one is not wedded to there being a right topology (see footnote 13), then one need not make a choice between the two collections of observables.
observables was supposed to be a problem is that the Algebraic Imperialist appears to not allow us to reconstruct the physics of, say, phase transitions and symmetry breaking. The idealizations the Hilbert Space Conservative constructs are in a certain sense the "right" ones because they allow us to give these physically significant explanations. We need to check that the observables the Algebraic Imperialist constructs by moving to the bidual have enough structure to be able to recover those physically significant explanations, too. First, notice that although A * * is initially only a Banach space, it can be made into a C*-algebra by defining multiplication and involution operations. We get these operations by Prop. 2 as the unique extensions of the multiplication and involution operations on the algebra J(A) (with algebraic structure inherited from A) such that multiplication is separately continuous in its individual arguments in the weak* topology 15 and involution is continuous in its only argument in the weak* topology. When we refer to C*-algebraic structure on A * * in what follows, these are the operations we will have in mind. The following proposition shows that the Algebraic Imperialist, using this structure on the bidual, has access to every idealized parochial observable that every possible Hilbert Space Conservative (for each possible distinct privileged representation) has access to.
kinds of physically significant explanations Ruetsche is worried about.
17,18

Parochial Observables for the Universalist
When we think about Universalism, we do not need to go through the rigamarole of defining a new kind of topology as we did for Imperialism in the previous section. The universal representation already comes with a topology that is precisely analogous to the weak operator topology used by the Hilbert Space Conservative: namely the weak operator topology on the collection B(H U ) of bounded operators on the universal Hilbert space H U . But how does the weak operator topology of the Universalist compare to the weak operator topology of the Hilbert Space Conservative?
While the Hilbert Space Conservative restricts attention to a privileged collection of states from the larger collection of states on the abstract algebra, the Universalist considers all states on the abstract algebra to be physically possible because they can all be implemented as finite rank density operators on the universal Hilbert space. In this sense, the Universalist is just like the Imperialist, so we expect their notions of approximation with respect to the empirical content of the theory to match up. As the following proposition shows, the notion of convergence of the weak operator topology on the universal representation corresponds exactly to the notion of convergence of the weak (or weak*) topology on the abstract algebra. (1) The net {A i } converges to A ∈ B(H U ) in the weak operator topology on B(H U )
(2) For all states φ on A, φ(A i ) = T r(ΦA i ) converges to T r(ΦA) in C, where Φ is any finite rank density operator (and there is always at least one) implementing the state φ on π U (A).
Just as for Prop. 1, in clause (2) the expectation values converge as complex numbers even though there is no element of the abstract algebra that the net is converging to. The collection 17 See Kronz and Lupher (2005) and Lupher (2008) , who also assert that the bidual contains all of the parochial observables. Here, I have added a precise characterization of how the parochial observables arise from the original algebra via limiting relations.
18 I do not claim that the observables the Algebraic Imperialist gets in Prop. 3 (or the analogous observables for the Universalist in the next section) are somehow the real or fundamental temperature, particle number, and net magnetization. All I claim is that these observables suffice to give the kinds of explanations that Ruetsche worries about. (See Sec. 5 for a view on which we do not need to worry about which observables are real or fundamental.) of bounded operators on the universal Hilbert space provides the ambient space of observables in which to think about these limit points or idealizations. This allows us to construct the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra, which contains the idealizations of our original observables with respect to a notion of idealization that is physically relevant by the lights of the Universalist.
We also note that Prop. 4 shows a sense in which the universal representation is privileged if one wants to think algebraically-its weak operator topology reproduces the precise condition of convergence of the weak (or weak*) topology on the abstract algebra A. Restricting attention to finite rank density operator states on the universal representation amounts to no restriction at all because every state is implementable as a finite rank density operator on the universal representation.
We already knew that the Universalist could acquire more observables by using the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra, but as in the previous section, we still need to ask whether the Universalist acquires the "right" ones. Does the Universalist have access to parochial observables like temperature, particle number, and net magnetization? The following proposition shows that the Universalist has access to every parochial observable that every possible (for each distinct privileged representation) Hilbert Space Conservative has access to (compare with Prop. 3).
Proposition 5.
If π is a representation of a C*-algebra A and π U is the universal representation of A, then there is a central projection P in π U (A) and a *-isomorphism α from the von Neumann algebra π U (A)P onto π(A) such that π(A) = α(π U (A)P ) for all A ∈ A.
19,20
The von Neumann algebra affiliated with any representation is canonicaly isomorphic to a subalgebra of the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra. This shows that every parochial observable can be thought of as an element of the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra and so can be thought of as an idealization from observables in the universal representation with respect to a notion of idealization that is physically relevant by the lights of the Universalist. Just as in the previous section, the Universalist gains access to all of the observables including temperature, particle number, and net magnetization, that we need to recover the physically significant explanations that
Ruetsche is worried about.
Ruetsche, however, presents a number of objections to the claim that the universal representation contains all parochial observables. I will consider what I take to be two of the most prominent objections here and argue that they fail. Seeing why they fail illustrates how the universal representation gives us access to all parochial observables.
First, Ruetsche asserts (2011, p. 145, fn. 10) that in the universal representation we would expect an observable π ω (A) from the GNS representation for ω to be implemented in the universal representation by a "portmanteau" operator of the form π ω (A) ⊕ φ =ω 0, and similarly for the parochial observables from the representation π ω which will be weak operator limits of these "portmanteau" operators. But, Ruetsche correctly argues that these operators may not be contained in the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra because it follows from Kadison & Ringrose Thm.
This objection, however, fades in light of Prop. 5. The "portmanteau" operators are obviously intended to capture the observables from the GNS representation for ω in the universal representation. Prop. 5 explicitly asserts that we can think of any observable π ω (A) in the GNS representation for ω as the observable π U (A)P in the universal representation (and similarly for parochial observables), where P is a central projection in the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra. Because of the presence of the projection P , such an observable acts nontrivially only on some subspace of the universal Hilbert space H U and acts like the zero operator everywhere else. This means that the operator π U (A)P has some properties analogous to the operator π ω (A) ⊕ φ =ω 0. But since operators of the latter form are not required to belong to the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra, it follows that P may not be the projection onto the GNS representation for ω. I know of no simple characterization of the range of P in terms of the direct summands of the universal representation;
21 nevertheless, I will show explicitly that P is not the projection onto the GNS representation for ω and that we should not be surprised by this fact.
Intuitively, the observable π U (A)P ought to act like π ω (A) on all of the vector states that π ω (A) acts on. But in general there will be many vectors in the universal Hilbert space H U that implement any vector state ψ corresponding to the vector Ψ ∈ H ω , which is the sort of vector that π ω (A) acts on. For example, the vector Ψ ⊕ φ =ω 0 will implement the state ψ in the universal representation. But so will the vector Ω ψ ⊕ φ =ψ 0, where Ω ψ is the cyclic vector implementing ψ in the GNS representation for ψ. In fact, there will be a vector implementing ψ in each direct summand of the universal representation that corresponds to a GNS representation unitarily equivalent to π ω . And furthermore, if φ is any mixture having nonzero component on the state ω, then the GNS representation of φ will be a direct sum containing the GNS representation of ω as one of its summands. It follows by similar considerations that there will be some vector in the GNS representation of φ (and hence in another summand of the universal representation) that implements the state ψ. The following proposition shows that the range of the projection P must contain all of these vectors implementing the state ψ.
Proposition 6. Let (π, H) be a representation of a C*-algebra A, let (π U , H U ) be the universal representation of A, and let P be the corresponding central projection in Prop. 5. Choose an arbitrary unit vector Ψ ∈ H. Then for any vector Φ ∈ H U implementing the vector state Ψ in the sense that
for all A ∈ A, it follows that P Φ = Φ.
This shows that the operators in the universal representation that correspond to operators from some particular GNS representation must take a more complicated form than the "portmanteau" operators Ruetsche suggests. In the universal representation, the correct operator must act on a whole host of vectors implementing the states from the GNS representation that we started with, and many of these vectors will lie elsewhere in the universal representation, outside of the GNS representation we began with. However, it is most important to recognize that even though the elements of the universal representation do not take the simple form we might have expected, Prop.
5 guarantees us that there is always some operator in the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra corresponding to the observable we are interested in. Minkwoski quantum and the state with one Rindler quantum. Hence, they will distinguish between 22 I am taking Ruetsche's claims out of context here. Really, she rejects the universalized particle notion as a "fundamental" particle notion (See Ruetsche 2011, Ch. 9 for more detail). However, considering her remarks as an objection to the view outlined here is illustrative. these two distinct states. The universal representation, by virtue of containing all of the parochial observables, gives us the ability to make as many distinctions between states as we might like.
I hope that these remarks concerning Ruetsche's objections suffice to show that all parochial observables really are contained in the universal representation, or more specifically the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra. Now I want to remark upon the fact that the technical results I have presented for the Imperialist's and Universalist's solution to the problem of parochial observables appear so similar-this is no coincidence. We have already mentioned that the universal representation (or really universal enveloping von Neumann algebra) and the abstract algebra (or really its bidual) share the same topological structure in the sense that the notion of convergence provided by the weak (or weak*) topology on A (or A * * ) reproduces precisely the notion of convergence provided by the weak operator topology on B(H U ). But these objects share much more structure than that. The following proposition shows that the bidual of a C*-algebra in a certain sense carries the same algebraic structure as the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra.
Proposition 7.
There is a *-isomorphism 25 α from the bidual A * * of a C*-algebra A to its universal enveloping von Neumann algebra π U (A) such that π U (A) = α(J(A)) for all A ∈ A.
26
Since the Imperialist and the Universalist invoke the same algebraic and topological structure to represent quantum systems, they end up believing in the same physically significant observables and the same physically possible states while using the same notion of approximation or idealization.
This shows a sense in which Algebraic Imperialism and Universalism amount to the same position.
Of course I do not claim that Imperialism and Universalism are equivalent with respect to every purpose we might put quantum theory to, but at least they are equivalent with respect to the interpretive uses just outlined. One may have pragmatic reasons for choosing one or the other-for example, one might want to use the universal representation if one is familiar with interpreting Hilbert spaces from ordinary quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, whatever quantum states and observables the Imperialist can represent, the Universalist can represent too (and vice versa). So the 25 Prop. 3 shows that this *-isomorphism is a W*-isomorphism in the sense of Sakai (1971, p. 40), i.e. it is also a homeomorphism in the weak* and weak operator topologies, respectively. This is a relevant notion of isomorphism because both A * * and π U (A) are W*-algebras (the abstract version of von Neumann algebras). I have argued that the problem of parochial observables fails to give us reason to reject Imperialism and Universalism, but I do not think that we ought to adopt those interpretations and I do not take this to be a defense of pristine interpretation. In showing that one can use the abstract algebra or its universal representation to adequately recover physically significant explanations I did not rely on the fact that Imperialism and Universalism are pristine interpretations. In particular, none of my arguments depended on thinking of theories as circumscribing a set of physically possible worlds by appealing to general metaphysical principles. To see this, I will outline two alternative adulterated interpretations that the arguments given in this paper support at least as well.
27
27 In fact, some might think my arguments support the adulterated interpretations over the pristine ones in light of the comments of footnotes 10, 13, 14, and 18. Those footnotes make caveats to avoid questions about the "right" topology, the "fundamental" observables, and the "reality" of idealizations, which the pristine interpreter might demand an answer to. I am not optimistic that one could provide answers to satisfy her. This, however, does not
The idea lurking behind the following adulterated interpretations is as follows. It is misleading to think that our scientific theories aim at specifying a set of physically possible worlds in the first place. Our scientific theories aim at providing a formalism or collection of tools that we can use for a variety of different purposes: making predictions, constructing explanations, modeling particular systems, generating new theories, examining relationships with past theories, and more.
28 This is not some sort of simple operationalism or instrumentalism, but rather a way of taking the practice of science seriously.
Whereas the Algebraic Imperialist would force algebraic methods upon everyone as the correct ones to describe the physical possibilities, her adulterated counterpart-let us call her the Algebraic Colonialist-merely asserts that we can use the abstract algebra to accomplish all our scientific goals. We can, for example, think of any two states-even states describing different thermodynamic phases of a statistical system-as states on the abstract algebra. As Prop. 3 shows, we can also think of any observable-even a parochial observable like temperature or net magnetization-as a limit point of a net of observables in the abstract algebra with respect to the weak (or really weak*)
topology. Hence, we can think of any observable as an idealization from a collection of observables in the abstract algebra. If we desired, we could also focus attention on a particular collection of states on the abstract algebra and use the weakest topology that makes those states continuous. That is essentially what we do when we take a Hilbert space representation and use the weak operator topology on that Hilbert space. For some scientific purposes, restricting our attention to certain states and changing our topology may turn out to be fruitful. 29 All the Algebraic Colonialist claims is that this practice can be understood algebraically and that we need not take representations at all to give the desired explanations, e.g. of phase transitions.
Similarly, whereas the Universalist claims that the universal representation once and for all specifies the physical possibilities, her adulterated counterpart-let us call her the Unitarian Universalist-is a bit more lax. The Unitarian Universalist simply claims that we can use the universal undermine the central arguments of the paper because an adulterated interpreter of the sort I describe here simply does not need to answer those questions for her purposes. 28 See Stein (1989) for a statement of a similar view and how it bears on the scientific realism debate. Also compare this view with the alternative adulterated interpretation that Ruetsche (2003 Ruetsche ( , 2011 ) ends up supporting.
29 See Fletcher (2014) for an argument that we ought to allow ourselves access to different topologies for different scientific purposes, at least in the case of general relativity.
representation to accomplish all of our scientific goals. We can, for example, think of any two states as density operators (or even vectors!) on the Hilbert space H U of the universal representation.
And, as Prop. 5 shows, we can think of any observable-again, even a parochial observable-as being contained in the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra. Hence, we can think of any observable as well approximated by or physically indistinguishable from a collection of observables with respect to the weak operator topology of the universal representation. Similarly, if we desired, we could restrict attention to some subrepresentation of the universal representation π U on a subspace of H U , thereby restricting our attention to a particular collection of density operator and vector states and defining a new topology by using the weak operator topology on this subspace.
Again, this may be useful for many scientific purposes, but the universal representation gives us all of the resources we need to accomplish these tasks.
We have seen that Algebraic Imperialism and Universalism amount to the same position, and for precisely the same reasons Algebraic Colonialism and Unitarian Universalism are equivalent as well. Prop. 4 shows that the weak topology on the abstract algebra yields the same criterion for convergence as the weak operator topology on the universal representation. And Prop. 7 shows that the bidual of the abstract algebra, which is just the original algebra with the addition of its limit points in the weak topology, can be thought of as the same collection of observables as the universal enveloping von Neumann algebra, which of course is a faithful representation of the original algebra with the addition of its limit points in the weak operator topology of that representation. So the abstract algebra and the universal representation allow us to countenance the same physically significant states and observables. (1) The net {A i } converges to A ∈ B(H) in the weak operator topology on B(H).
(2) For all finite rank density operators ρ on H, T r(ρA i ) converges to T r(ρA) in C. (1) The net {A i } converges to A ∈ B(H U ) in the weak operator topology on B(H U ) (2) For all states φ on A, φ(A i ) = T r(ΦA i ) converges to T r(ΦA) in C, where Φ is any finite rank density operator (and there is always at least one) implementing the state φ on π U (A).
Proof. (1 ⇒ 2) Suppose A i → A in the weak operator topology on B(H U ). Let Φ be any finite rank density operator (there is always at least one) implementing a state φ on π U (A). Then by Prop. 1,
is non-empty, or in other words we will show that there is a y = J(x) ∈ J(X) such that for all
It suffices to consider only a linearly independent subset of the linear functionals l 1 , ..., l n ∈ X * forming a basis for the subspace of X * spanned by these functionals: if x ∈ X satisfies the above inequality for this linearly independent subset of l 1 , ..., l n ∈ X * , then it must also satisfy the inequalities for the rest of the linear functionals, or else the inequalities would contradict each other and then n i=1 (x + N (l i , i )) would have to be empty, which it is not because it containsx.
Choose this linearly independent set of functionals l k1 , ..., l km . We know (Schechter 2001 , p. 93, Lemma 4.14) that there exists a dual basis e 1 , ..., e m ∈ X for a subspace of X such that l ki (e j ) = δ ij for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Consider the vector x = m i=1x (l i )e i . We have for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
Hence, x satisfies the above inequalities in (1) and it follows that
Proposition 6. Let (π, H) be a representation of a C*-algebra A and let (π U , H U ) be the universal representation of A. Let P be the central projection in Prop. 5, and choose some unit vector Ψ ∈ H.
Then for any vector Φ ∈ H U implementing the vector state Ψ in the sense that
for all A ∈ A, it follows that P Φ = Φ. (1997, p. 719)) , the projection P takes the form
where β is the ultraweakly continuous extension of the map β = π • π −1 U and R(T * ) is the projection onto the range of T * . With Φ and Ψ as above,
It suffices to show that Φ, EΦ = 0, which shows that the second term above is zero.
We know that E = T ∈Ker(β) R(T * ) ∈ Ker(β), so it follows that
Choose a net A i ∈ A such that π U (A i ) converges in the weak operator topology on B(H U ) to E. It follows immediately that π(A i ) = β(π U (A i )) converges in the weak operator topology on B(H) to
where w-lim denotes the weak operator limit in the relevant Hilbert space.
Appendix B: An Illustration in Classical Systems
Suppose that the system under consideration is classical so that A is abelian. Examining the weak topology and weak operator topologies of representations of this algebra illustrates the concepts of section 4 in a somewhat more familiar and concrete setting (although admittedly not the most familiar or concrete!). 30 Recall that when A is abelian, it is *-isomorphic to C(P(A)), the continuous functions on the compact Hausdorff space P(A) of pure states of A with the weak* 
.3). As such, each observable
A ∈ A corresponds to a functionÂ ∈ C(P(A)) defined bŷ
for each pure state ω ∈ P(A). 107, Thm. IV.14), each state ω on A corresponds to a unique regular Borel measure µ ω on P(A)
30 Feintzeig (2015) similarly uses the classical case to gain insight about interpreting the algebraic formalism. This section can be understood as adding to that project.
such that for all
The GNS representation of A for the state ω is unitarily equivalent to the representation 31 (π ω , H ω ) on the Hilbert space H ω = L 2 (P(A), dµ ω ), with π ω defined by
where the operator MÂ is defined as multiplication by the functionÂ, i.e. for any ψ ∈ H ω ,
Now, we can pull the discussion of topologies on A back to the more familiar topologies on ordinary functions on P(A). We recall these topologies now before proceeding. Let f n be a net of functions on P(A). We say that f n converges to the function f uniformly if sup ψ∈P(A) |f n (ψ)−f (ψ)| converges to zero in C. We say that f n converges to the function f pointwise if f n (ψ) converges to f (ψ) in C for each ψ ∈ P(A). And finally, we say that f n converges to the function f pointwise almost everywhere with respect to a measure µ on P(A) if f n (ψ) converges to f (ψ) in C for all ψ ∈ P(A) except possibly on a set of measure zero with respect to µ. Now it is easy to show that for the GNS representation (π ω , H ω ), the weak operator topology on B(H ω ) is the topology of pointwise convergence almost everywhere with respect to the measure µ ω . This implies that while π ω (A) is the collection of multiplication operators by continuous functions (which is uniformly closed), its weak operator closure π ω (A) will be the collection of multiplication operators by essentially bounded measurable functions with respect to the measure µ ω (i.e., L ∞ (P(A), dµ ω )).
In some cases, taking the weak operator closure (and hence, moving to the essentially bounded measurable functions) does not give rise to any new parochial observables. When ω is pure,
31 Here, the relevant cyclic vector Ωω is the constant unit function.
for all A ∈ A, where δ(ω) is the point mass or delta function centered on ω. It follows by the uniqueness clause of the Riesz-Markov theorem that dµ ω = δ(ω). So every vector ψ ∈ H ω will be defined by a single complex number-the value of ψ on ω ∈ P(A) and H ω will be one-dimensional.
Hence, B(H ω ) will be one-dimensional and since π ω (A) contains the identity and is closed under scalar multiplication, it follows that π ω (A) = B(H ω ) = π ω (A). This means that there are no parochial observables in this representation. Furthermore, even the GNS representations for many mixed states do not give rise to new parochial observables. Consider an arbitrary state ω on A such that µ ω has support on only a countable subset of P(A). In such a special state, since the measure focuses our attention on only a countable subset of P(A), the continuous functions coincide with the essentially bounded measurable functions-every discontinuous but essentially bounded measurable function is equivalent to a continuous function when we ignore differences on sets of measure zero.
In other words, focusing only on a countable subset of P(A) does not allow one to distinguish between continuous and merely bounded functions. So it similarly follows that π ω (A) = π ω (A) and there are no parochial observables in this representation.
However, we can also have an arbitrary mixed state ω on A such that µ ω has support on an uncountable subset of P(A). In this case, we may acquire new parochial observables. The weak operator closure will include even discontinuous functions like characteristic functions (projection operators), where the original algebra did not. Since each one of these essentially bounded measurable functions is the weak operator limit point of a collection of continuous functions, we can understand them as idealizations from or approximations to collections of our original observables.
So the essentially bounded (but discontinuous) measurable functions with respect to some measure are the parochial observables for an algebra of continuous functions in the representation defined by that measure.
But, comes the obvious retort, in a similar sense every bounded function (without considering any measure) can be considered as an idealization from or approximation to a collection of our original observables without appeal to any measure, and hence without appeal to any representation. The sense in which this is true uses the weak topology on A. In particular, every bounded function is the pointwise limit of a collection of continuous functions. The topology of pointwise convergence for functions is just the weak topology on A (really, extended to the weak* topology on A * * ), so A * * is just the collection of bounded functions on P(A). Since every parochial observable qua essentially bounded function is equivalent to a bounded function (ignoring differences on sets of measure zero), it follows that every parochial observable can be thought of as the weak (pointwise) limit of observables in the abstract algebra. This provides our algebraic route to all of the parochial observables at once, without reference to any representation.
On the other hand, we can gather all the parochial observables in a single representation as in where MÂ |supp(dµω) is the multiplication operator by the restriction ofÂ to the support of dµ ω because that is equivalent to MÂ on H ω . The operator π U (A) in a certain sense amounts to the multiplication operator byÂ everywhere because we have taken the direct sum over spaces with all possible regular normalized Borel measures and so for each point ω ∈ P(ω) there is some summand in which {ω} gets assigned nonzero measure. This is why π U gives a faithful representation whereas each individual GNS representation is not faithful (because functions that disagree only on a set of measure zero are mapped to the same multiplication operator by that GNS representation). Weak The upshot is that the abstract algebra and its universal representation give us two routes to
